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This document is an extended version of our article published in Review of Industrial 
Organisation (2015). It serves two purposes. First, it is intended for students and 
professionals who may not have the econometric background to go easily through our 
published article; hence it is more self-contained and pedagogical. Second, it develops the 
links with our previous working papers on the same topic, namely CIRANO 2011s-35 
The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges, CIRANO 2012s-15 How Much Do Cartels 
Typically Overcharge?, and TSE WP-462 (2014) How Much Do Cartels Overcharge? 
These working papers have now been withdrawn for circulation. 
___________________________________________________________ 
(*) We are very grateful to the Editor (Lawrence White) of the Review of Industrial Organization for his patience 
as well as for his generous and challenging comments and suggestions. We also benefited from remarks by two 
anonymous referees and by Jimmy Royer and René Garcia. We remain solely responsible for its content.   
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Abstract The estimation of cartel overcharges lies at the heart of antitrust policy on cartel 
prosecution as it constitutes a key element in the determination of fines. Connor and Lande 
(2008) conducted a survey of cartels and found a mean overcharge estimate in the range of 31% 
to 49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010) finds a mean of 50.4% for successful cartels. 
However, the data used in those studies are estimates obtained from different methodologies, 
sources and contexts rather than from direct observations. Therefore, these data are subject to 
model error, estimation error, endogeneity bias, and publication bias. An examination of the 
Connor database reveals that the universe of overcharge estimate is asymmetric, heterogenous 
and contains a number of influential observations. Beside the fact that overcharge estimates are 
potentially biased, fitting a linear regression model to the data without providing a carefull 
treatment of the problems raised above may produce distorted results. We conduct a meta-
analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in the spirit of Connor and Bolotova (2006) while 
providing a sound treatment of these matters. We find bias-corrected mean and median 
overcharge estimates of 15.47% and 16.01%. Clearly, our results have significant antitrust policy 
implications. 
Keywords: Antitrust, Cartel overcharges, Heckman, Heckit, Kullback-Leibler divergence, 
Meta-analysis  
 
Résumé L’estimation des surprix des cartels est au cœur de la politique de lutte aux cartels car 
elle est un élément clé de la détermination des pénalités. Connor et Lande (2008) survolent la 
litérature sur les majorations de prix des cartels et concluent à une augmentation moyenne variant 
entre 31% et 49%. Considérant un échantillon plus grand, Connor (2010) trouve une moyenne de 
50,4% pour les cartels réussis. Cependant, les données utilisées dans ces études sont des 
estimations obtenues à partir de méthodologies, sources, et contextes différents plutôt que 
d’observations directes. De ce fait, ces données héritent potentiellement d’erreurs de modélisation 
et d’estimation, ainsi que de biais d'endogenéité et de publication. L’analyse directe des surprix 
dans l’échantillon de Connor révèle une distribution asymétrique, une importante hétérogénéité et 
la présence d’observations aberrantes. Au-delà du fait que les estimations des surprix sont 
potentiellement biaisées, l’estimation d’un modèle de régression linéaire avec de telles données 
sans un traitement adéquat des problèmes identifiés ci-dessus pourait produire des résultats 
fallacieux. Nous présentons une méta-analyse dans l’esprit de Connor and Bolotova (2006), mais 
qui tient compte adéquatement des problèmes mentionnés ci-dessus. Après correction des biais, 
nous obtenons une moyenne et une médiane de majorations de prix de l’ordre de 15,47% et 
16,01%. Nos résultats débouchent sur des enjeux importants en matière de politique de la 
concurrence. 
Mots-clés : Antitrust, Surprix de cartel, Heckman, Heckit, Divergence de Kullback-Leibler, 
Meta-analyse 
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1.		Introduction	
Our aim in this paper is to determine the order of magnitude of the average cartel overcharge, 
based on a database of cartels used by Connor (2010).1 This database contains overcharge 
estimates (OE) obtained from a survey of several studies on cartels as well as three types of 
variables. The first group (Y) consists of variables that describe the cartel episode (e.g. duration, 
scope, geography, etc.). The second group (Z) consists of factors that are posterior to the cartel 
episode (e.g. estimation method, publication source). The third group (W) consists of a single 
dummy variable which indicates whether the cartel was “found or pleaded guilty”. While Y and 
W are likely related to the true overcharge, Z are likely to capture potential biases. 
The raw OE data are themselves potentially biased and the variable W is likely endogenous. 
Hence, a naive OLS regression of the OE on Y, W and Z should be avoided. To verify whether 
the OE are biased or not, we perform a meta-regression analysis in the spirit of Connor and 
Bolotova (2006) who show that part of the variability of OE is indeed due to the bias factors. 
We use a Kullback-Leibler divergence to compare the probability of an OE being larger than 
some value θ conditional on (Y,W) to the same probability conditional on (Y,W,Z). The two 
conditional probabilities are quite close for θ ∈ ሾ0%, 65%ሿ but diverge sharply for θ ൐ 65%. 
This divergence is caused by the fact that the joint distribution of the variables involved in the 
probit models specified for the probability of (OE>θ) become degenerate as θ exceeds a certain 
threshold. Next, we regress the logarithm of OE on Y, W and Z on increasing subsamples of type 
ሺ0, θሿ. The results allow us to identify the range ܱܧ ∈ ሺ0%, 49%ሿ as the most reliable subsample 
on which a Heckit regression can be performed to obtain unbiased estimates of coefficients which 
can be used to infer bias-corrected OE for the whole sample.  
Applying the methodology described above, we find mean and median bias-corrected OE of of 
16.68% and 16.17% for the subsample of effective cartels (with stricly positive OE), and of 
15.47% and 16.01% for the whole sample. These numbers are significantly lower than the means 
and medians of the raw OE data. Moreover, the comparison of bias-corrected mean and median 
OE reveals a fairly homogenous behavior of cartels across different types, geographical locations, 
and time (antitrust) periods.   
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the context and the literature 
surrounding our research. Section 3 presents the raw OE and discusses data problems. Section 4 
illustrates the danger of converting Lerner indices into OE while ignoring the competitive mark-
                                                            
1 The database actually describes cartel episodes. Each episode is treated as a different observation. There is 
no formal proof or admission of guilt for approximately one third of the observations. Hence, the data 
include convicted cartels as well as alleged ones. We sincerely thank Professor John Connor for generously 
making his database available to us. 
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ups. Sections 5 and 6 presents the methodology used to detect the presence of bias in the OE data. 
Section 7 presents the determinants of cartel overcharge unveiled by our meta-analysis. Section 8 
presents the steps of our bias-correction methodology and the summary statistics for the bias-
corrected OE. Section 9 presents an analysis of variance for the OE bias. Section 10 concludes. 
Table 2 and Appendix A contain summary statistics of the database. Appendix B summarises our 
previous attempts to model and bias-correct the raw OE. Appendices C and D discuss 
methodological aspects not covered in the main text. 
2.	The	Context	
The United States Sentencing Guidelines recommends a base fine of 10% of the affected volume 
of commerce to a firm convicted of cartel activity, plus another 10% for the harms "inflicted upon 
consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the higher price". This 
yields a fine of 20%, subject to further adjustments for aggravating and mitigating factors. The 
observed total financial fines generally fall in a range from 15% to 80% of affected sales. 
Moreover, there is a possibility of incarceration for the individuals involved in the collusion. For 
fiscal years 2010-2014 (5 years), U.S. antitrust prosecutions resulted in over US$5.14 billion in 
criminal fines and penalties, including the largest cartel fine in history namely $1.14 billion for 
the liquid crystal display (LCD) panel cartel, and more than 295 years of jail time. 
In the European Union, the determination of fines accounts for the severity of the damages 
inflicted upon consumers, suppliers and clients as well as aggravating and mitigating factors. The 
basic fine is set in a range of 0% to 30% of affected commerce plus 15% to 25% as an additional 
dissuasive measure. However, the total fine must not exceed 10% of the "worlwide group 
turnover in the financial year preceding the decision."2 For fiscal years 2010-2014 (5 years), 
European antitrust prosecutions resulted in over €8.93 billion in criminal fines and penalties. This 
amount includes the highest fine in history, namely €1.47 billion for the TV and computer 
monitor tubes cartel. 
In Canada, penalties for “agreements between competitors to fix prices, restrict production, or 
allocate sales, customers or territories” (a per se offense since March 2010) may reach $25 
million per count and up to 14 years in prison. But actual penalties levied have not been close to 
those maxima yet. As in the U.S., the Canadian Competition Bureau uses a proxy for economic 
harm of 20% of the volume of affected commerce to set fines, 10% for the basic overcharge and 
10% for other harm including the deadweight loss.3 
                                                            
2 Source: "The EU competition Rules on Cartels," document published the law firm Slaughter and May in 
2012. Publically available on the website of the company. 
3 The harm caused to society is equal to the cartel overcharge, which being a transfer from  buyers to sellers 
may not appear as an efficiency loss or harm, plus additional social costs, namely the deadweight losses 
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Connor and Lande (2008) examined a large number of OE studies and found an average in the 
range 31% to 49% and a median in the range 22% to 25%. Based on this, they concluded that "the 
current Sentencing Commission presumption that cartels overcharge on average by 10% is much 
too low, and the current levels of cartel penalties should be increased significantly ". A similar 
study conducted by Connor (2010) concludes that "...penalty guidelines aimed at optimally 
deterring cartels ought to be increased".  
Combe and Monnier (2011, 2013) performed an analysis of 64 cartels prosecuted by the 
European Commission and concluded that "fines imposed against cartels by the European 
Commission are overall sub optimal."  
In criticizing the Canadian Competition Bureau approach, Kearney (2009) wrote “The assumption 
of an average overcharge of 10 percent also has been put into question by economic survey 
evidence which suggests that the median long-run overcharge is much greater than 10 percent. 
Research conducted by Professor John Connor indicates 'that the median long-run overcharge 
for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0 percent …' Accordingly, an assessment of 
economic harm based on an estimated overcharge of 10 percent is not supported by the empirical 
evidence.” 
However, Cohen and Scheffman (1989) argued that an increase of 1% of a price above its natural 
competition level usually results in a reduction of sales of more than 1%. Based on this, they 
concluded with respect to the USSG guidelines that "at least in price-fixing cases involving a 
large volume of commerce, ten percent is almost certainly too high". Adler and Laing (1997) and 
Denger (2003) also judged that the fines imposed by the US Department of Justice are 
"astronomical" or "excessive" (Connor and Bolotova 2006, p. 1112).   
Allain, Boyer and Ponssard (2011) develop a dynamic model of cartel stability and find that the 
cartel-level fines imposed by the European Commission in the 64 cartels analysed by Combe and 
Monnier are on averagre above the proper deterrence level.4 Considering a more recent database 
at the firm level, Allain et alii (2015) conclude that the majority of firm-level fines imposed by 
the European Commission over the period 2005-2012 are above the deterrence level. 
Hence, there is disagreement among specialists about the magnitude of cartel overcharges and 
thus, about optimal fines. Our paper contributes to this debate by providing an econometric 
method which appropriately deals with the limitations of the Connor database.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
and the resources devoted to antitrust authorities for fighting cartels, plus other effects such as the impact 
on investment and employment, on entry and exit dynamics, on innovation and learning curve, etc. 
4 Boyer (2013) discusses this recent literature. 
5 
 
3.		The	Connor	Database	
As mentioned earlier, the database used for our study is an extended version of the one used in 
Connor (2010). The raw sample consists of 1178 cartels episodes, from which 59 are discarded 
for missing information. This leaves us with a sample of 1119 cartels with OE ranging from 0% 
to 1800%. The mean OE is 45.5% on the whole sample and 49% for the subsample of strictly 
positive OE. The mean is 20.5% for the cartels with OE lying strictly between 0% and 49%, 
representing 69.9% of the sample. OE that are larger than 49% represent 22.9% of the sample and 
the average OE for this subsample is 136.2%.  
However, the sample means of 45.5% and 49% are influenced by a small number of outliers. 
Roughly 1% of OE are larger than 400% and when the 5% largest observations are left out of the 
sample, the average OE drops from 49% to 32%. These outliers should be treated carefully when 
using econometric methods that are sensitive to their presence (e.g., OLS regressions). The 
skewness of the distribution (Figure 1)5 implies a significant difference between the means and 
medians. 
It should be emphasized that the overcharge data consists of estimates previously published by 
different experts and researchers. Therefore, they are potentially subject to model errors, 
estimation errors, endogeneity bias, and sample selection.6  
The raw overcharge data are quite heterogenous across regions, scope (domestic vs international), 
and time periods (Table 1). This clearly raises aggregation problems. Indeed, the average 
overcharge obtained for the whole sample is meaningful only if the conditions that determine the 
but-for price are the same across time and markets. As noted by Levenstein and Suslow (2003), 
"The reported price increases vary widely by industry and by source." 
 
  
                                                            
5 Connor (2014) finds a long run median overcharge of 23.0% and a mean of at least 49.0% for all cartels of 
all times. The skewness problem is pointed out by Connor and Lande (2008) and Connor (2010). It should 
be emphasized that Connor has been conservative in recording some of the OE, notably by tagging and 
excluding peak estimates from the sample (see Connor, 2010, pp. 48 and following). 
6 Ehmer and Rosati (2009) point out that many estimates in Connor’s sample are obtained from “a simple 
calculation of the difference between prices charged during the operation of the cartel and in other periods 
or other markets that are believed to be competitive. By completely neglecting all other factors that can 
cause prices to change, the authors of these estimates simplistically attribute the entire price variation to 
the effects of the cartel.” 
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Figure 1 
Overcharge Estimates: Distribution skewed to the right. 
  
Note: Overcharges larger than 400% (1% of the sample) are not shown on this figure. 
 
Table 1 
Means and medians of raw OE per location and types of cartels.  
All 
Cartels OE>0% 0%<OE≤49%  OE>49% 
Cartels 
Before 
1973 
Cartels 
After 
1973 
All locations 
Mean 45.46 49.01 20.46 136.21 61.98 38.88
Median 23.00 25.00 18.30 73.00 29.00 21.20
prop. 100.00 92.77 69.88 22.87 28.51 71.49
US 
Mean 38.15 42.03 19.44 123.82 47.79 33.58
Median 20.50 23.50 17.30 69.20 30.50 16.80
prop. 30.02 27.25 21.36 5.90 9.65 20.37
EU 
Mean 42.65 45.57 19.07 113.01 43.83 41.86
Median 23.00 25.00 16.05 75.00 24.75 20.40
prop. 33.51 31.36 22.52 8.85 13.40 20.11
Domestic 
Mean 33.60 36.91 18.43 137.58 35.42 32.79
Median 17.05 19.00 16.10 69.70 20.50 16.45
prop. 46.82 42.62 36.01 6.61 14.47 32.35
International 
Mean 55.91 59.29 22.62 135.66 89.38 43.91
Median 30.00 31.75 22.00 74.45 37.00 27.50
prop. 53.17 50.13 33.87 16.26 14.03 39.14
Note: The prop. are percentages of the total Connor sample (1119 cartels). 
 
The following variables are listed in the Connor database: 
 θ෠ - the overcharge esimates (OE), which is described in Table 1. 
Yଵ- Duration, discretized: 1 if duration is less than 5 years, 2 if duration is from 6 to 10  
years, 3 if duration is from 11 to 15 years, and 4 if duration is 16 years or more. 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
fre
qu
en
cy
overcharge estimates
7 
 
Yଶ- Scope: equals 1 if domestic and 0 if international. 
Yଷ- Bid rigging: equals 1 if Yes and 0 if No. 
Yସ- Geographic market: five dummy variables for US, EU, ASIA, ROW including Latin 
America, and WORLD cartels that cannot be associated to a head region. 
Yହ- Antitrust law regime in the US: six dummy variables for P1 (1770-1890),  
 P2 (1891-1919),  P3 (1920-1945), P4 (1946-1973), P5 (1974-1990),  
 and P6 (1991-2004). 
W- Found guilty or pleaded guilty: equals 1 if Yes and 0 if No. 
ܼଵ- Overcharge estimation method: dummy variables for Price before conspiracy 
(PBEFOR), Price war (PWAR), Price after conspiracy (PAFTER), Yardstick 
(YARDST), Cost based (COST), Econometric modeling (ECON), Historical case 
study with no method specified (HISTOR), legal decisions (LEGAL) and other 
unspecified methods (OTHER). 
ܼଶ- Type of publication: dummy variables for Peer reviewed journal (JOURNAL), 
Chapters in a book (EDBOOK), Monograph or book (MONOGR), Government 
report (GOVREP), Court or antitrust authority source (COURT), Newspapers 
(NEWSPAPER) Working paper (WORKP), and Speech or conference (SPEECH). 
The Y variables describe the alleged cartel episode and are therefore objectively related to the 
true overcharge. The period dummy variables (Yହ) are used in Connor and Bolotova (2006) to 
capture the effect of changes in US antritrust law regimes over time. These dummies are closely 
related to eras identified and studied at length by Kovacic and Shapiro (2000). The early time 
periods (P1, P2 and P3) are likely to be more important for the US than for the rest of the 
world. This argues for interacting those time periods with the US geographical market dummy in 
our regressions. 
The Z variables describes circumstances that are posterior to the occurrence of the cartel episode. 
They are rather subjective and may therefore generate an overcharge estimation bias. Regarding 
the estimation methods (Zଵ), the traditional “yardstick” involves a cross-section comparison of 
firms, products or markets. The “before-and-after” and the “price war” methods might be 
considered as the time series version of the “yardstick”. The “cost-based” and the “econometric” 
methods represent more sophisticated measurement efforts at implementing either version of the 
yardstick method. See Appendix B for a brief description of these overecharge estimation 
methods.  
The variable W (Guilty or not) is alone in its category. It is potentially related to the true 
overcharge while open to subjectivity: a guilty plea or judgement is not a foolproof indicator of 
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guilt, but an entity that chooses to plead guilty has likely been involved in an effective price-
fixing conspiracy. This argues for treating W as a distinct category.   
Our study uses the Y, W and Z variables described above to explain the OE.7 Table 2 presents 
summary statistics of all variables. Additional summary statistics are presented in Appendix A.  
 
Table	2 
Summary	statistics	of	the	Connor	database.	
  mean std min max 
OE 45.46 102.90 0 1800 
Duration 9.25 11.86 1 109 
duration (discrete) 1.86 1.06 1 4 
Domestic 0.47 0.50 0 1 
BidRig 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Guilty 0.66 0.48 0 1 
US 0.30 0.46 0 1 
EU 0.34 0.47 0 1 
ASIA 0.09 0.28 0 1 
ROW 0.04 0.19 0 1 
WORLD 0.24 0.43 0 1 
P1 0.01 0.08 0 1 
P2 0.10 0.30 0 1 
P3 0.11 0.31 0 1 
P4 0.15 0.35 0 1 
P5 0.57 0.50 0 1 
P6 0.07 0.25 0 1 
OTHER  0.06 0.24 0 1 
HISTOR  0.02 0.13 0 1 
PBEFOR  0.27 0.44 0 1 
PWAR  0.02 0.14 0 1 
PAFTER  0.13 0.34 0 1 
COST  0.05 0.21 0 1 
YARDST  0.14 0.35 0 1 
ECON 0.14 0.34 0 1 
LEGAL  0.18 0.38 0 1 
JOURNAL  0.22 0.41 0 1 
MONOGR  0.23 0.42 0 1 
EDBOOK  0.06 0.24 0 1 
GOVREP 0.23 0.42 0 1 
COURT  0.01 0.09 0 1 
NEWSPAPER 0.18 0.38 0 1 
WORKP  0.01 0.07 0 1 
SPEECH  0.06 0.24 0 1 
Sample size 1119 
 
  
                                                            
7 In addition to Y1 through Y5, the vector Y contains the interactions of the US geographical market with 
the periods P1, P2 and P3. 
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4.	The	Proper	Characterization	of	the	But‐for	Price	
To illustrate the necessity to properly characterize the but-for price, let us consider the estimation 
error one can make by converting Lerner indexes directly into cartel overcharges.   
Let ݌෤ be the price imposed by a cartel and ݌ the but-for price, i.e. the price that would prevail 
absent the cartel. The cartel overcharge expressed as a percentage of the but-for price is given by 
δ ൌ ሺp෤ െ pሻ/p.	While the cartel price ݌෤ is observed, the but-for price ݌ needs to be estimated.  
An important cause of bias in OE resides in the difficulties raised by the proper characterization 
of the but-for environment. Indeed, the observed time series of prices are resultant of several 
causes. For instance, an inelastic demand may grant a firm significant market power that translate 
into high mark-ups. Product differentiation can cause a previously pure-and-perfect competitive 
market to behave as a monopolistic competition one. However, oligopolistic markets have 
margins over MC that can be significantly larger than zero. As noted by Morrison (1990), "The 
empirical results suggest that mark-ups in most U.S. manufacturing firms have increased over 
time, and tend to be countercyclical."  Hall (1988, Table 4) claims that the ratio p/c is in the range 
of 2 to 4 in US industries. 
The proper but-for price is equal to the marginal cost plus a margin. In pure and perfect 
competition, this margin is low and even close to zero. The accurate assessment of this margin is 
quite important when converting Lerner indices into cartel overcharges.8 The Lerner index of 
market power is defined as: 
L ൌ ୮ିୡ୮   (1) 
where ݌ is the market price and ܿ is the marginal cost (MC). If the condition that would prevail in 
the absence of a cartel is pure and perfect competition, the but-for price is by ݌ ൌ ܿ so that ܮ ൌ 0. 
The corresponding overcharge in the cartelized market is given by δ ൌ ୮෥ି୮୮  and the Lerner index 
is L ൌ ୮෥ିୡ୮෥ . The Lerner index is converted into overcharge via the formula δ ൌ
୐
ଵି୐. 
In general, the competitive but-for price is equal to ܿ plus a margin ݉: ݌ ൌ ܿ ൅ ݉. Likewise, the 
Lerner index in the cartelized market should be calculated as L ≡ ୫෥ୡା୫෥ , where ෥݉  is the inflated 
mark-up due to the cartel. Therefore, the true cartel overcharge is given by δ ≡ ୫෥ି୫ୡା୫ . However, 
the overcharge that would be inferred from the Lerner index (wrongly) assuming pure and perfect 
competition as benchmark is: 
                                                            
8 An overcharge calculation approach based on the Lerner index can fall within the family of econometric 
methods or cost-based methods depending on how this index is estimated. 
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δ෨ ≡ ୐ଵି୐ ൌ
୫෥
ୡ ൌ δ ൅
୫
ୡ ሺδ ൅ 1ሻ (2) 
Equation	(2)	illustrates the danger of converting Lerner indices into OE by ignoring the existence 
of competitive mark-ups in the but-for price.9 If the true overcharge is ߜ ൌ 10% and ௠௖ ൌ 20%, 
the estimation bias implied by ߜሚ is 32%, i.e. more than three times the true value. Note that the 
bias is increasing in both the true ߜ and ௠௖  (see the following Table A)  The other overcharge 
estimation methods are not necessarily exempt of biases either.10 
Table	A	
Pitfall	in	the	Conversion	a	Lerner	Index	Into	an	OE:	Constant	overcharge,	constant	margin,	
and	bias	increasing	as	the	marginal	cost	decreases.	
Parameters  Values  
ߜ  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  
݉  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  
c  0.20  0.1625  0.1250  0.0875  0.05  
௠
௖   10%  12.3 %  16%  22.9%  40%  
Bias ൌ ୫ୡ ሺδ ൅ 1ሻ  11%  14%  18%  25%  44%  
ߜሚ ൌ ߜ ൅ ܤ݅ܽݏ  21%  24%  28%  35%  54%  
Bias ߜሚൗ  52.4% 58.3% 64.3% 71. 4% 81. 5% 
 
5.	A	Formal	Assessment	of	the	Quality	of	the	OE	Data	
We consider assessing the effectiveness profile of cartels from the OE data available to us, where 
the effectiveness profile is defined as the probability Prሺθ୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧ሻ	of the true overcharge 
being strictly larger than a given thresold θ, for θ ൒ 0. 
To this end, we assume the existence of a latent variable X* such that: θ୧ ൐ ߠ if and only if 
ܺ∗ ൐ 0 and ܺ∗ ൌ 	a ൅ Y୧b ൅W୧c ൅ ε, where	ε~Nሺ0, σሻ. The variable X* is specific to each θ 
although this dependence is not made explicit by the notation. Under these assumptions, we have: 
Prሺθ୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧ሻ ൌ Prሺܺ∗ ൐ 0|Y୧,W୧ሻ ൌ Prሺa ൅ Y୧b ൅W୧c ൅ ε ൐ 0ሻ,	 
 ൌ	Prሺε ൐ െܽ െ Y୧b െW୧cሻ ൌ Φ	ሺa ൅ Y୧b ൅W୧cሻ  (3) 
                                                            
9 Table 2 of the appendix to Connor (2010) provides a “Summary of Price-Fixing Damages, Social-Science 
Studies”. The table presents 280 cartels, their OE and a description of the estimation method. Of the 280 
OE, 51 have been obtained by conversion of a Lerner index. Connor (2014) reports Lerner indices as OE 
without conversion, thereby subject to upward biases. 
10 For instance, see White (2001) for a critic of the before-and-after methods employed by Connor (1997) in 
the ADM-lysine case. 
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Unfortunately, we do not observe θ୧. Instead, we observe an estimate θ෠୧ which is potentially 
influenced by the exogenous (bias) factors Z୧. Thus, we can reasonably assume that: 
Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ ൌ Φ൫a෤ ൅ Y୧b෨ ൅W୧c෤ ൅ Z୧d෨൯ (4) 
If θ෠୧ were unaffected by the bias factors Z୧, then it would be an unbiased estimator of θ୧ and d෨  
should be equal to zero in Equation (4). We would then have: 
Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ ൌ Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ ≅ Prሺθ୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧ሻ  
Otherwise, the term Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ can be quite different from both Prሺθ୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧ሻ and 
Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯. The impact of Z୧ on OE can be detected by examining the following 
Kullback-Leibler divergence: 
∆ሺߠሻ ൌ ଵ୬∑ Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ ൣlog Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ െ log Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯൧୬୧ୀଵ  (5) 
The Kullback-Leibler divergence (see Kullback and Leibler, 1951) tells how dissimilar two 
distributions are. It is strictly positive if the two distributions are different and equals zero if and 
only if they coincide.  
Indeed, consider two probability distribution functions f(x) and g(x). Jensen's inequality implies: 
logE୥ ൬fg൰ ൒ E୥log ൬
f
g൰ 
where E୥ is the expectations with respect to g(x). However, the LHS of the previous inequality is 
equal to zero since: 
logE୥ ൬fg൰ ൌ logන
fሺxሻ
gሺxሻ gሺxሻdx ൌ logන fሺxሻdx ൌ log	ሺ1ሻ ൌ 0 
Therefore: 
E୥log ൬fg൰ ൌ න log ቆ
fሺxሻ
gሺxሻቇ gሺxሻdx ൑ 0 
Inverting the fraction inside the log yields: 
න log ቆgሺxሻfሺxሻቇ gሺxሻdx ൌ න൫logሺgሺxሻ െ log	fሺxሻ൯gሺxሻdx ൒ 0 
Finally letting gሺxሻ ≡ Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯, fሺxሻ ≡ Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ and replacing the integral 
by a discrete summation lead to the expression provided for ∆ሺθሻ in equation (5). 
Any discrepancy between Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ is attributable to Zi. Figure 
2 plots the values of the Kullback-Leibler divergence ∆ሺθሻ on the y-axis against θ on the x-axis.  
To obtain Figure 2, we estimate Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ for ߠ	increasing by 
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steps of 5% from 0% to 200%; hence, 40 Probit equations are estimated in total for each of the 
conditional probabilities Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯.  
We note that the predicted values of Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ agree to a large 
extent when θ lies between 0% and 65%. However, the two conditional probabilities diverge 
dramatically as soon as θ ൐ 65%.  This suggests that either OE lying above 65% are heavily 
biased or there is a quality of the data issue with some of the dummy regressors used in the Probit 
models. 
Figure 2  
Detecting the impact of the bias factors via the Kullback-Leibler divergence 
 
Note: The Kullback-Leibler distance, ∆ሺθሻ, is on the y-axis and θ on the x-axis. The 
Probit models that predict Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ are estimated by 
using a step of 5% for θ. The large jump observed at θ=65 is caused either by huge biases 
in OE or by other data problems involving the regressors. 
 
In an attempt to understand the shape of Figure 2, we examine the averages of the explanatory 
variables on selected ranges of OE (See Table 3). We see for instance that there is no cartel from 
the ROW with overcharge above 60%. There is no US cartels of the period P1 (the USxP1 row) 
with more than 50% overcharge. Likewise, the number of OE collected from historical case 
studies and from speeches fall to zero after 70%. The latter fact deserves attention as the jump 
observed on Figure 2 occurs precisely between θ ൌ 65% and θ ൌ 70%. 
Some subtle data problems may remain unnoticed. For instance, the sample averages of HISTOR 
and SPEECH are the same for all headers of Table 3. A carefully examination of the data shows 
that 217 of the 219 OE lying above 50% are obtained via estimation methods other than 
"historical case studies" and released through publication media other than "speeches" (i.e., 217 
of 219 cartels satisfy HISTOR=0 & SPEECH=0). In particular, there is no cartel such that 
HISTOR=1 & SPEECH=1. This kind of data problem will eventually translate into multi-
collinearities. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics: Average values of the explanatory variables on selected ranges of OE 
OE>50 OE>60 OE>65 OE>70 OE>75 
duration 1.927 1.910 1.950 1.985 2.009 
domestic 0.288 0.270 0.275 0.267 0.274 
BidRig 0.082 0.079 0.063 0.067 0.051 
Guilty 0.543 0.551 0.525 0.519 0.521 
US 0.260 0.270 0.263 0.237 0.222 
EU 0.374 0.354 0.369 0.400 0.402 
ASIA 0.091 0.101 0.094 0.096 0.103 
ROW 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P1 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.009 
P3 0.146 0.152 0.156 0.170 0.179 
P4 0.142 0.135 0.144 0.163 0.154 
P5 0.137 0.146 0.138 0.126 0.128 
P6 0.452 0.455 0.444 0.430 0.436 
USxP1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
USxP2 0.078 0.073 0.075 0.059 0.060 
USxP3 0.046 0.056 0.063 0.059 0.060 
OTHER 0.027 0.034 0.031 0.037 0.034 
HISTOR 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 
PBEFOR 0.292 0.258 0.281 0.274 0.248 
PWAR 0.037 0.022 0.019 0.015 0.009 
PAFTER 0.155 0.169 0.150 0.141 0.128 
COST 0.068 0.084 0.088 0.074 0.077 
YARDST 0.215 0.236 0.244 0.267 0.299 
LEGAL 0.078 0.073 0.069 0.074 0.085 
JOURNAL 0.169 0.169 0.150 0.133 0.094 
MONOGR 0.269 0.264 0.281 0.296 0.291 
EDBOOK 0.105 0.107 0.113 0.111 0.111 
COURT 0.237 0.247 0.244 0.252 0.282 
NEWSPAPER 0.023 0.028 0.025 0.015 0.017 
WORKP 0.096 0.073 0.075 0.074 0.068 
SPEECH 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Sample size 219 178 160 135 117 
Note: There is no cartel from the ROW with overcharge above 60%. Also, the number of OE  
collected from historical case studies and from speeches fall to zero after 70%.  
 
To support the claim that biases in OE are attributable to the Z variables, it is necessary to assess 
to which extent our results are impacted by the data problems identified above. For robustness 
check, we repeat the exercise of Figure 2 after some data transformations. First, we remove the 
dummy variable ROW, thereby assuming that the reference group for the geographical market is 
"WORLD+ROW". Second, we merge the interaction variables USxP1 and USxP2. Third, we 
merge the estimation methods HISTOR and OTHER. Finally, we merge the publication sources 
NEWSPAPER and SPEECH. Table 4 shows the estimated Probit models for the binary variables 
defined by the headers of Table 3 after applying the data transformations. There is no visible 
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identification problem based on the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients. Indeed, explosive 
coefficient estimates would be suggestive of the presence of identification issues.11 
Table 4 
Probit estimation results for selected ranges of OE > θ 
OE>50 OE>60 OE>65 OE>70 OE>75 
Duration 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 
domestic -0.82*** -0.89*** -0.78*** -0.75*** -0.64***
BidRig -0.38*** -0.41** -0.50*** -0.39** -0.57***
Guilty -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12 
US 0.38** 0.45*** 0.36** 0.31* 0.21 
EU 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.15 
ASIA 0.64*** 0.72*** 0.60*** 0.65*** 0.55** 
P1 -0.11 0.31 0.45 0.72 0.61 
P3 -0.52* -0.45 -0.45 -0.42 -0.16 
P4 -0.46 -0.40 -0.32 -0.27 -0.09 
P5 -0.68** -0.43 -0.43 -0.57 -0.26 
P6 -0.74** -0.53 -0.42 -0.42 -0.06 
US x (P1+P2) -0.09 -0.15 -0.08 -0.27 0.03 
US x P3 0.50 0.70** 0.81** 0.70* 0.73** 
OTHER+ HISTOR -0.47* -0.27 -0.30 -0.43 -0.53* 
PBEFOR 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.02 -0.16 
PWAR 0.61* 0.14 -0.02 -0.20 -0.58 
PAFTER 0.28 0.37* 0.26 0.09 -0.08 
COST 0.53** 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.48* 0.41 
YARDST 0.39** 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.45** 0.48** 
LEGAL -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.22 -0.24 
JOURNAL -0.34 -0.46* -0.55** -0.73*** -1.02***
MONOGR -0.41** -0.46** -0.42* -0.45** -0.47** 
EDBOOK 0.02 -0.16 -0.10 -0.19 -0.37 
COURT -0.12 -0.25 -0.24 -0.38 -0.40 
NEWSPAPER+SPEECH 0.31 0.36 0.30 -0.39 -0.37 
WORKP -0.52** -0.80*** -0.75*** -0.85*** -0.98***
Sample size 219 178 160 135 117 
Note: The Probit models are estimated using transformed data. The table shows the estimated coefficients 
when ROW is removed so that the reference group for the geographical market is "WORLD+ROW", 
USxP1 and USxP2 are merged into USx(P1+P2),the estimation method HISTOR is merged with OTHER, 
and the publication sources NEWSPAPER and SPEECH are merged. Throughout the paper, ***, **, and * 
indicate that a coefficent is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Figure 3 shows the curve of the Kullback-Leibler divergence based on the transformed data.12  
This curve has the same shape as on Figure 2. However, the data transformations have moved the 
jump from 65% on Figure 2 to around θ=95% on Figure 3. This suggests that the jumps seen on 
                                                            
11 As a foretaste of our analysis of the determinants of cartel overcharge, we see in Table 4 that domestic 
cartel are less conducive to price increases than international cartels for all subgroups parametrized by θ. 
Similarly for bid rigging cartels compared to other cartels and for cartels reproted in monographies, court 
documents, and wortking papers compared with those reported in government reports (the reference group). 
We observe also that Asian cartels seem more conducive to price increases than cartels in the 
WORLD+ROW reference group for all subgroups parametrized by θ. 
12 Here too, we estimate 40 Probit equations for Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and for Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ to obtain 
Figure 3. 
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both figures are caused by the fact that the joint distribution of the variables involved in the probit 
models of Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ become degenerate as the cursor θ is 
moved above certain levels.13 
Figure 3 
The Kullback-Leibler divergence after correcting identification issues  
 
Note: ∆ሺθሻ is on the y-axis and θ on the x-axis. The Probit models that predict Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐
ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ are estimated by using a step of 5% for θ. The data 
transformations have moved the jump from θ=65 on Figure 2 to θ=95 on Figure 3. 
In an effort to better understand the nature of the jumps seen on Figures 2 and 3, we examine 
separately the two components of the Kullback-Leibler divergence given by the following, where 
∆ሺθሻ ൌ ∆଴ሺθሻ െ ∆ଵሺθሻ:14 
∆଴ሺθሻ ൌ ଵ୬∑ Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ log Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯୬୧ୀଵ   (6) 
∆ଵሺθሻ ൌ ଵ୬∑ Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ log Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯୬୧ୀଵ ,		 ሺ7ሻ	
Figure 4 shows the curves of ∆଴ሺθሻ and ∆ଵሺθሻ based on the transformed data. We see that ∆ଵሺθሻ 
diverges abruptly from ∆଴ሺθሻ at θ=95%, which is exactly where the large jump occurs on Figure 
3. The fact that the curve of ∆଴ሺθሻ is smooth everywhere indicates that only the Z variables are 
causing the jump. 
We have seen previously that the Kullback-Leibler distance ∆ሺߠሻ ൌ ∆଴ሺθሻ െ ∆ଵሺθሻ is positive. 
Hence, ∆଴ሺθሻ is the upper bound of ∆ଵሺθሻ as the probabilities Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ approach 
Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ uniformly over the sample. Any significant improvement in the model fit 
induced by Z୧ will translate into a visible divergence between ∆଴ሺθሻ and ∆ଵሺθሻ.  We see on 
                                                            
13 By degeneracy, it is meant that some of our dummy regressors has no variation above a certain threshold 
of OE, as shown by Table 3.  
14 Note that ∆଴ሺθሻ	and	∆ଵሺθሻ are negative since they involve the log of probabilities. 
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Figure 3 that the Kullback-Leibler divergence increases slowly as one moves from θ=0% to 
θ=95%.  
In summary, the magnitude of the overcharge estimation bias is increasing with the raw OE, but 
the large jumps seen on Figures 2 and 3 are caused by data problems. This suggests to treat the 
subsample of cartels with OE>65% (14.29% of the sample) with caution. Note that nowhere is 
claimed that OE lying above 65% are all biased upward, nor that OE lying below 65% are all 
exempt of bias. Indeed, the Kullback-Leibler distance is not necessarily robust to positive biases 
that leave the proportion of OE larger than θ unaltered. The fact that the probabilities Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐
ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ agree much at θ ൌ 0 means that Zi does not affect the 
proportion of zeros OE, but it might influence the size of positive OE. The next step of our 
analysis deals with the latter aspect, i.e., the effect of Zi on the conditional mean E൫θ෠୧|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯.  
Figure 4 
Decomposition of ∆ሺθሻ into two components 
Note: Any significant improvement in the model fit induced by Z୧ will translate into a 
visible difference between ∆଴ሺθሻ and ∆ଵሺθሻ. The difference between ∆଴ሺθሻ and ∆ଵሺθሻ 
becomes visible around θ=20 and increases slowly up to θ=95. However,  ∆ଵሺθሻ diverges 
suddenly from ∆଴ሺθሻ after θ=95. The jump seen of Figure 4 occurs precisely at θ=95. 
 
6.	A	Meta‐Analysis	of	the	Cartel	OE	
Meta-analyses are used in experimental fields to summarize the findings of studies on a particular 
topic. They may also be used to verify if the conditions of experiments impact their results. 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004) write: “[...] In our view, the purpose of meta-analysis is to estimate 
what the results would have been had all the studies been conducted without methodological 
limitations and flaws”. The meta-analysis conducted here is consistent with this statement. Our 
goal is to understand what causes the bias in the raw OE, unveil the determinants of cartel 
overcharge, and predict bias-corrected OE. 
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It is reasonable to expect that the true overcharge depends on the conspiracy period, the duration 
of the cartel, the characteristics of the firms involved in the collusion, and factors alike. However, 
we do not observe the true overcharge. Instead, we observe an estimate of it that is equal to the 
actual overcharge plus a bias. This bias can be positive, null or negative. Hence in addition to 
factors that affect the true overcharge, we can expect the OE to be sensitive to subjective factors 
that may cause the bias, namely the estimation method or the publication source which are 
“posterior” to the occurrence of the conspiracy. Formally, the bias is defined as the influence of 
factors that affect the OE, but not the true overcharges. 
If the true overcharge θ୧ were observable, our objective would reduce to understanding what 
causes the bias in θ෠୧. To this end, we would simply regress logθ෠୧ െ logθ୧ on Z୧. The bias-
correction of θ෠୧ and the prediction of θ୧ then become minor issues. As θ୧ is not available to us, we 
specify a model where logθ෠୧ is on the LHS and potential determinants of the true overcharge and 
of the estimation bias are on the RHS. In this approach, endogeneity issues regarding the 
determinants of the true overcharge need to be addressed. 
We specify a log-linear meta-analysis model on truncated subsamples of type OE ∈ ሺ0, θሿ, where 
θ varies from 25% to 70% by steps of 1%.15 The model estimated is: 
logθ෠୧ ൌ β଴ ൅ Y୧βଵ ൅W୧βଶ ൅ Z୧βଷ ൅ ımrෞ ୧βସ ൅ e୧	 ሺ8ሻ	
where θ෠୧ ∈ ሺ0, θሿ, with θ ∈ [25%, 70%], and ımrෞ ୧ is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). The latter 
variable is calculated for each observation using the output of a preliminary Probit model fitted to 
the indicator of θ෠୧ ∈ ሺ0, θሿ (i.e., the selection variable). Hence, we first estimate a Probit for each 
value of θ ∈ [25%, 70%]16 using the whole sample; next, we compute ımrෞ ୧ for each observation 
lying in the range ሺ0, θሿ; finally, we estimate Equation (8) using the subsample (0,θ]. This is the 
well-known Heckit procedure of Heckman (1979), where an IMR variable computed from a first 
step Probit is included in the second step estimation in order to control for selection biases that 
would arise from the right truncation of the sample at θ. Details on the Heckit procedure and the 
calculation of the IMR are given in Appendix D. 
We prefer the Heckit to a right censored Tobit because the former is less restrictive than the latter. 
Moreover, the Tobit model assumes that the regressand (here, OE) has not been measured with 
systematic biases while our goal is precisely to estimate and remove the bias contaminating OE. 
We focus on modeling the log of OE because their distribution is more symmetric, as shown by 
Figure 5. 
                                                            
15 We choose not to go beyond θ =70% as our previous analysis concluded that the overall data quality is 
low on the range OE>65%. 
16 That is, 45 different values of θ in total. 
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Figure 5 
Logarithm of positive OE (92.8% of the sample) 
 
 
The Heckit procedure requires that some regressors be included in the first step Probit from which 
the IMR is estimated and excluded from the second step regression. Such regressors are called 
exclusion variables and they ensure the identification of the parameters estimated at the second 
step. An ideal exclusion variable is a determinant of the probability of the OE belonging to the 
range ሺ0, θሿ that has no direct influence on the OE. Unfortunately, none of the regressors 
available to us is eligible for this role on theoretical grounds. 
To circumvent this difficulty, we consider shrinking the information set repesented by the bias 
factors (Z) in the second step estimation. More precisely, we use Y and W along with the Z 
variables as regressors in the first step probit. In the second step regression, the estimation 
methods "historical case studies", "legal decisions" and "Other" are merged into a single category. 
The type of publications "journals" and "working papers" are merged under one group, "book 
chapters" and "monographs" under a second group, and "Newspapers” and "Speech" under a third 
group. All other categories are kept unchanged. This shrinkage of the information set plays as 
exclusion restrictions. 
The endogeneity of W 
The variable W୧ which indicates whether the cartel case has been resolved with a guilty plea or 
decision is likely endogenous. Indeed, the decision to plead guilty is potentially related to the 
existence and size of the overcharge: A guilty plea may be suggestive that a firm has been 
involved in an effective price-fixing collusion. And similarly if the firm was found guilty. 
We consider estimating two second step regressions, one in which W୧ is included and another one 
in which it is instrumented. The first regression is predictive while the second is more structural. 
The structural regression is aimed at estimating the coefficients of the regressors without bias, 
while the predictive model targets point forecasts of the regressand. 
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In the structural approach, our instrumental regression consists of a Probit model where the 
probability of a guilty plea is conditioned by the Y-variables. The endogeneity problem is 
addressed by replacing W୧ by the Probit prediction of Pr	ሺW୧ ൌ 1|Y୧ሻ. Further exclusion variables 
are in principle needed in the structural approach while none is available to us. Fortunately, 
singularity is avoided because the probability of a guilty plea is nonlinear in the included 
instruments. 
The estimated coefficients obtained from Equation (8) are used to predict bias-corrected OE 
conditional on θ෠୧ ∈ ሺ0, θሿ: 
θ෠ୠୡଵ,୧ሺθሻ ൌ exp ቀβ෠଴ ൅ Y୧β෠ଵ ൅W୧β෠ଶ ൅ ımrෞ ୧β෠ସ ൅ ஢ෝ౛
మ
ଶ ቁ , θ෠୧ ∈ ሺ0, θሿ	 ሺ9ሻ	
We also compute bias-corrected estimates unconditionally17 by removing the IMR and using the 
same parameter estimates as above: 
θ෠ୠୡଶ,୧ሺθሻ ൌ exp ቀβ෠଴ ൅ Y୧β෠ଵ ൅W୧β෠ଶ ൅ ஢ෝ౛
మ
ଶ ቁ , θ෠୧ ൐ 0	 ሺ10ሻ	
The Probit from which the IMR is inferred is estimated with the subsample of cartels with strictly 
positive OE (1038 cartels), θ෠ୠୡଵ,୧ሺθሻ is computed for cartels with OE lying in the range (0,θ] 
while θ෠ୠୡଶ,୧ሺθሻ is computed for the subsample of successful cartels (θ෠ ൐ 0). 
Given that the subsample used for estimation is truncated from the right, the Heckit should 
predict a larger average bias-corrected OE on the whole sample than in the subsample, that is:  
θതୠୡଵሺθሻ ൌ ଵ୬ሺ஘ሻ ∑ θ෠ୠୡଵ,୧ሺθሻ஘෡౟∈ሾ଴,஘ሿ ൑ 	
ଵ
୬∑ θ෠ୠୡଶ,୧ሺθሻ୬୧ୀଵ ൌ θതୠୡଶሺθሻ (11) 
where nሺθሻ is the size of the subsample used for estimation. Furthermore, θതୠୡଵሺθሻ should be a 
non decreasing function of θ over the valid range of overcharges while θതୠୡଶሺθሻ should be 
approximately flat. 
Violation of either of these rules is suggestive of the presence of biases in the OE data that our 
procedure failed to completely remove. Figures 6 and 7 plot θതୠୡଵሺθሻ and θതୠୡଶሺθሻ on the y-axis 
against θ on the x-axis.18 
                                                            
17 That is, unconditionally on the truncation θ෠୧ ∈ ሺ0, θሿ. Indeed, the presence of the IMR makes the 
predictions of Equation (9) specific to the subsample used for estimation. This becomes obvious by noting 
that the logarithm of Equation (9) is the fitted part of Equation (8). Zero overcharges are excluded from the 
sample. Therefore, the predictions are conditional on θ෠୧ ൐ 0 as well. 
18 θതୠୡଶሺθሻ	should be flat as it is an estimate of the average bias-corrected OE of all cartels based on the 
subsample of cartels with OE lying in the range (0,θ]. However, the representativeness of this subsample is 
not warranted when θ is small. This explains why the curve θതୠୡଶሺθሻ is decreasing at first. As for θതୠୡଵሺθሻ, it 
is an estimate of the average bias-corrected OE for cartels with raw OE lying in an increasing range, 
namely (0,θ]. 
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Figure 6 shows the case where W is used as regressor (predictive approach) while Figure 7 is for 
the case where W is instrumented (structural approach). On both figures, θതୠୡଶሺθሻ is overall 
decreasing on θ ൑ 49% and weakly increasing on θ ൐ 49%. If the bias contaminating the raw 
OE had been completely removed, the curve of θതୠୡଶሺθሻ should be flat at least on the second half 
of the support of θ. This curve is flatter on Figure 7 than on Figure 6, which suggests that part of 
the problem is due to the endogeneity of W. 
 
Figure 6 
Average bias-corrected OE predicted for the subsample θ෠୧ ∈ ሾ0, θሿ by the predictive model 
 
Note: Dash-dotted line: average bias-corrected OE  θതୠୡଵሺθሻ on the subsample used 
for estimation. Solid line: average bias-corrected OE θതୠୡଶሺθሻ on the whole sample 
 
Figure 7 
Average bias-corrected OE predicted for the subsample θ෠୧ ∈ ሾ0, θሿ by the structural model 
 
Note: Dash-dotted line: average bias-corrected OE  θതୠୡଵሺθሻ on the subsample used 
for estimation. Solid line: average bias-corrected OE θതୠୡଶሺθሻ on the whole sample 
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In our empirical framework, the sample selection bias arising from the right truncation of the OE 
is controlled by the IMR, while the original bias contaminating the raw OE is corrected by Z. The 
fact that θതୠୡଶሺθሻ is increasing on θ ൐ 49% does not necessarily mean that the correction for 
sample selection is ineffective. Indeed, the same pattern would be observed if Z is less and less 
effective at capturing the initial bias contaminating the OE as the truncation threshold increases 
away from 49%.  
As expected, θതୠୡଵሺθሻ is overall increasing in θ. On Figure 6 however, the curves of θതୠୡଵሺθሻ and 
θതୠୡଶሺθሻ are close and intertwined on the domain θ ൐ 49%. This indicates that the Heckit 
procedure successfully corrects the sample selection bias.19 This suggests that the least distorted 
Heckit model is the one estimated with θ ൌ 49%. 
On Figure 7, θതୠୡଵሺθሻ remains strictly below θതୠୡଶሺθሻ. Furthermore, the curve of θതୠୡଵሺθሻ is 
smooth and monotonic to a greater extent on Figure 7 than on Figure 6. This again is suggestive 
that the endogeneity correction matters. 
7.	The	Determinants	of	Cartel	Overcharge	
The results of Section 5 lead us to restrict the analysis of Section 6 to cartels with OE lower than 
65%. The results of Section 6 further lead us to restrict the analysis to cartels with OE lower than 
49%. The current section presents the estimation results when the sample is truncated at 49%. 
Appendix A presents summary statistics for the subsamples of alleged cartels with OE=0, 
0<OE≤49% and OE>49%. Table 5 shows the Probit estimation results for the probability of a 
cartel being successful at raising its price above the competitive level.20 This Probit is trustworthy 
given our previous finding that Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧൯ and Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ ߠ|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ agree to a great extent 
at θ ൌ 0.  
There is a positive link between the duration of a cartel and its probability of being successful. 
Domestic cartels tend to be less successful than international cartels while bid-rigging tends to be 
more successful than other forms of cartels. Cartels resolved with a guilty plea have a higher 
probability of being succesful than the other cartels. The geographical location and time period 
seem to have no effect on the probability of a cartel being successfull.  
 
                                                            
19 As an estimator of the average overcharge of all cartels, θതୠୡଵሺθሻ is biased (due to sample selection) while 
θതୠୡଶሺθሻ is expected to be unbiased. However, the sample selection bias decreases naturally as the threshold 
θ increases. Therefore, the fact that θതୠୡଵሺθሻ converges to θതୠୡଶሺθሻ as	θ increases suggests that the amount of 
sample selection bias removed by means of the IMR is reasonably accurate. 
20 Note that a cartel can fail at raising its price while being effective along other competitive dimensions 
(e.g., entry, capacity, innovation, advertizing, credit terms, etc.). The database available to us does not 
permit to address such issues. 
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Table 5 
Probit model for the probability of a cartel being successful:  
Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ 0|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ 
 
Marginal Effects at 
the Median 
Constant 0.14** 
Duration 0.01** 
Domestic -0.03* 
BidRig 0.08*** 
Guilty 0.04** 
US -0.03 
EU 0.00 
ASIA -0.01 
ROW -0.03 
P1 1.63 
P3 -0.05 
P4 0.01 
P5 -0.04 
P6 -0.02 
US x P1 0.13 
US x P2 0.06 
US x P3 -0.03 
OTHER  -0.09*** 
HISTOR  -0.18*** 
PBEFOR  0.02 
PWAR  0.00 
PAFTER  0.01 
COST  0.00 
YARDST  0.02 
LEGAL  0.07* 
JOURNAL  -0.04 
MONOGR  0.05 
EDBOOK  0.01 
COURT  0.01 
NEWSPAPER  1.65 
WORKP  0.07* 
SPEECH 1.67 
Note: Estimation is done using the whole sample (1119 cartels). The coefficients of 
P1, NEWSPAPER and SPEECH have not converged. However, estimation results 
are similar when these dummies are removed or merged with other groups. 
 
A higher proportion of zero OE is obtained via historical case studies with no method specified 
than in studies that specify an estimation method. The proportion of strictly positive OE obtained 
via legal decisions is higher than for other estimation methods. Finally, working papers contain a 
significantly higher proportion of strictly positive OE than other publication sources. The 
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coefficients of the dummy variables P1, NEWSPAPER and SPEECH have not converged.21 
However, the estimation results are qualitatively similar when these dummies are removed. 
Of all successful cartels, which ones are able to overcharge by more than 49%? In Table 6, we 
attempt to provide an answer by estimating a Probit model for Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ 49|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯. The sample 
used for the estimation is restricted to the cartels with strictly positive OE. We note that domestic 
cartels and bid rigging cases are associated with a lower probability of an OE being more than 
49%. The "Guilty" dummy (W) does not seem to be an important determinant of the probability 
of θ෠୧ ൐ 49, contrasting with what is found in Table 5 for Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ 0|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯. Hence, pleading 
guilty is suggestive that the cartel has been effective, but not that the overcharge is above 49%. 
The probability of overcharging by more than 49% is higher for US cartels (particularly, US 
cartels of Period P3) and ASIA cartels compared to the reference group WORLD. We also note 
that the Z-variables are significantly correlated with the indicator of θ෠୧ ൐ 49. Indeed, OE 
obtained via econometric methods and those published in working papers and academic journals 
have relatively lower probabilities of being more than 49%.  
Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients of the meta-regressions. The dependent variable in 
these regressions is the log of OE. Therefore, if the coefficient of a RHS dummy variable is βi, the 
average OE for the group where the dummy variable takes the value 1 is exp(βi) times the average 
OE of the reference group. This represents a percentage increase or decrease of exp(βi)-1. As the 
OE is already expressed in percentage, we will read the results in terms of factor of increase or 
decrease in order to avoid confusions. 
The predictive regression suggests that the ability of a cartel at raising its price increases with its 
duration. On average, the overcharge increases by a factor of exp(0.06)=1.06 per quinquennium. 
Domestic cartels overcharge by a factor of exp(-0.3)=0.74 less than international cartels. Cartels 
resolved with a guilty plea overcharge by a factor of exp(0.27)=1.31 more than the other cartels. 
Cartels of the EU overcharge by exp(-0.23)=0.79 less than cartels from other geographical 
location. OE obtained via a "Price before", "price war" or "yardstick" method are on average 
larger than those obtained by other estimation methods. Also, OE published in monographs, 
edited books, newspaper and speeches are on average higher than those published in other media. 
In the structural model, the coefficient of the "Guilty" dummy variable is not significant. This 
suggest that a guilty plea has no causal effect on overcharges even though it has a predictive 
effect. In retrospect, this result is quite intuitive: a firm adopts a guilty plea strategy because it has 
                                                            
21 Probit coefficients are expected to be reasonably small and not explosive (i.e., generally, but not 
necessarily, smaller than 1). In the Probit of Table 5, the estimated coefficients of NEWSPAPER and 
SPEECH are quite large (approx, =15) although the marginal effects are of reasonable magnitude. 
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been involved in a successful cartel (i.e., "positive overcharge" causes "guilty plea") and not the 
converse. 
The R-square of the log-linear regression is slightly higher for the predictive model (0.09) than 
for the structural model (0.08). This is not surprising as the structural model is aimed at achieving 
an unbiased estimation of the parameters used to bias-correct the raw OE while the predictive 
model delivers the best fit of the OE in terms of in-sample mean square error. 
Table 6 
Probit model for Pr൫θ෠୧ ൐ 49|Y୧,W୧, Z୧൯ 
 
Marginal Effects at 
the Median 
Constant -0.06 
Duration 0.01 
Domestic -0.26*** 
BidRig -0.11** 
Guilty -0.02 
US 0.11** 
EU 0.06 
ASIA 0.22*** 
ROW -0.14 
P1 0.35 
P3 -0.16 
P4 -0.10 
P5 -0.06 
P6 -0.14 
US x P1 -5.53 
US x P2 0.04 
US x P3 0.25** 
OTHER  0.21*** 
HISTOR  0.20 
PBEFOR  0.10* 
PWAR  0.24** 
PAFTER  0.13** 
COST  0.16** 
YARDST  0.18*** 
LEGAL  0.03 
JOURNAL  -0.13* 
MONOGR  -0.11 
EDBOOK  -0.03 
COURT  -0.11 
NEWSPAPER  0.10 
WORKP  -0.24*** 
SPEECH -0.35 
Note: Overcharge estimates that are equal to zero (81 observations) 
are excluded. This leaves us with 1038 cartels with strictly positive 
overcharge. To estimate the Probit models, we generate the dummy 
indicator of θ෠୧ ൐ 49%. The length of that dummy is 1038; it contains 
782 "zeros" and 256 "ones". 
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Table 7 
Meta-Analysis of cartel OE 
   Predictive regression Structural regression 
Constant 2.30*** 2.16*** 
Duration 0.06* 0.06 
Domestic -0.30* -0.44* 
BidRig -0.04 -0.03 
Guilty 0.27*** -0.03 
US -0.12 -0.06 
EU -0.23** -0.21* 
ASIA 0.10 0.15 
ROW -0.14 -0.24 
P1 -0.25 0.07 
P3 -0.22 -0.19 
P4 -0.25 -0.20 
P5 -0.02 0.07 
P6 -0.18 -0.08 
US x P1 -1.29 -4.59 
US x P2 0.09 0.23 
US x P3 0.42 0.41 
IMR 0.13 0.32 
OTHER+HISTOR+LEGAL 0.01 0.08 
PBEFOR  0.25** 0.32*** 
PWAR  0.49* 0.60** 
PAFTER  0.16 0.25* 
COST  0.14 0.21 
YARDST  0.32* 0.41*** 
JOURNAL+WORKP 0.16 0.11 
MONOGR+EDBOOK 0.46*** 0.41* 
COURT  0.16 0.18 
NEWSPAPER+SPEECH  0.64** 0.64** 
R-square 0.09 0.08 
Note: Estimation is done with the subsample 0% ൏ θ෠୧ ൑ 49% (782 cartels). An IMR 
obtained from Table 6 is included to control for the right truncation of the sample. 
Therefore, the estimation results concern effective cartels only. The predictive model 
is a Heckit that ignores the endogeneity of "Guilty". In the structural model, "Guilty" 
is instrumented. 
 
Connor and Bolotova (2006) performed a meta-analysis of cartel OE in which they modelled the 
OE as a linear function of Y and Z.  
θ෠୧ ൌ β଴ ൅ Y୧βଵ ൅W୧βଶ ൅ Z୧βଷ ൅ ε୧ (12) 
They estimated different restrictions of the full model. For their full model (column [7] of Table 6 
in their paper), they found that the OE is positively related to the duration, but does not depend on 
whether the firm is "guilty" or not; it is lower for domestic cartels and for cartels that have 
operated in the EU; it is neither higher nor lower for bid-rigging cases contrary to what is claimed 
by Cohen and Scheffman (1989); and that the size of overcharges has declined over time. Connor 
and Bolotova attributed the latter result to the increased severity of antitrust regulation. 
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Interestingly, they also found that the ܼ variables have significant impacts on OE. For example, 
they found the “yardstick” method to produce estimates that are at least 10% higher than the 
"after the conspiracy" method. For the publication sources, they found that “government reports” 
and “court reports” produce estimates that are respectively 22% lower and 15% higher than 
"monograph or book". The fact that the ܼ variables show significant effects in the regression 
suggests that the raw OE are indeed biased. 
Our results differ in significant ways from theirs. First, we find that cartels who pleaded guilty 
have higher overcharge on average, but this effect is not causal. Second, we find that more recent 
cartels (periods P5 and P6) are not really different from cartels of previous periods regarding 
average pricing behavior. The antitrust law regime have no impact on the probability of an 
overcharge being positive. However, it has an impact on the distribution of positive overcharges. 
More precisely, US cartels of the period P3 have a higher probability of overcharging by more 
than 49% than other cartels in other periods. 
8.		Bias‐correcting	the	OE	
The coefficients estimated from the predictive regression (Table 7) are possibly distorted by the 
endogeneity of "Guilty". Therefore, these coefficients should not be used to predict bias-corrected 
OE. The coefficients estimated from the structural regression (Table 7) are expected to be 
unbiased and may therefore be used to predict bias-corrected OE. However, some information can 
still be gleaned from the residuals of the latter regression as it is potentially correlated with 
"Guilty". 
Our ultimate objective, which is to obtain good predictions of average bias-corrected OE,  
requires that we first remove the causal effect of the Z-variables from the raw OE. Once this step 
is completed, a predictive regression of the "cleaned" OE onto Y can be used to estimate bias-
corrected conditional means of OE. This strategy which combines the strenghs of the structural 
and reduced-form approaches is presented below. 
To begin, we estimate the second step regression by excluding the "Guilty" dummy variable (W). 
The estimated equation on (0%, 49%] is:  
logθ෠୧ ൌ β෠଴ ൅ Y୧β෠ଵ ൅ Z୧β෠ଷ ൅ ımrෞ ୧β෠ସ ൅ e୧,	 ሺ13ሻ	
This step is aimed at obtaining coefficient estimates that are not distorted by the endogeneity of  
Wi. The exclusion of W is justified by our previous finding that this variable has no causal effect 
on the overcharge. Next, we infer bias-corrected OE in (0%, 49%] by removing the contribution 
of the Z variables, that is: 
logθ෠ୠୡ,୧ ൌ logθ෠୧ െ Z୧β෠ଷ	 ሺ14ሻ	
Finally,	we	estimate	a	predictive	regression	of	logθ෠ୠୡ,୧	onto	Y୧,	W୧	and	ımrෞ ୧:	
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logθ෠ୠୡ,୧ ൌ β෠଴ ൅ Y୧β෠ଵ ൅W୧β෠ଶ ൅ ımrෞ ୧β෠ସ ൅ e୧	 ሺ15ሻ	
The variable W is included in regression (15) for the purpose of exploiting its preditive power. 
Equation (13) is a causal regression while Equation (15) is a predictive regression. Table 8 shows 
the estimated coefficients for Equation (15). 
Table 8 
Predictive Model of Bias-corrected OE 
  Coefficients
Constant 2.57*** 
Duration 0.06** 
Domestic -0.28** 
BidRig -0.03 
Guilty 0.24*** 
US -0.13 
EU -0.25*** 
ASIA 0.05 
ROW -0.13 
P1 -0.30 
P3 -0.21 
P4 -0.25 
P5 -0.01 
P6 -0.19 
US x P1 0.62 
US x P2 0.07 
US x P3 0.42 
IMR -0.18 
R-square 0.06 
Note: Estimation output for Equation (15) using 0% ൏ θ෠୧ ൑49% (782 cartels). The estimation results concern effective 
cartels only. 
	
We see that the "Guilty" dummy variable has significant predictive power on bias-corrected OE. 
This predictive power was missed by the structural regression shown in Table 7. The negative 
coefficient of the "domestic" dummy variable (-0.28, significant) is stronger than in the predictive 
model (-0.20, non significant) but weaker than in the structural model (-0.37, significant). Cartels 
that operate in the EU have lower overcharge than those from other geographical markets.  
The bias-corrected OE of effective cartels are inferred by using the parameters estimates of 
Equation (15) into Formulas (10). First, one estimates Equation (13) on the subsample (0%, 49%] 
using the logarithm of the raw OE as regressand. Second, one uses Equation (14) to obtain bias-
corrected OE for each cartel. Third, one estimates Equation (15) on the subsample (0%, 49%] 
using the log of bias-corrected OE as regressand. Finally, one uses Equation (10) to predict bias-
corrected overcharges for all cartel with a positive overcharge conditional on Y and W. 
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Our previous analysis suggested that the raw OE data permits to identify an effective cartel from 
an ineffective one. Therefore, the initial 0% OE are assumed exempt of bias and left unchanged.  
Table 9 replicates Table 1 with bias-corrected OE as input. For the subsample with initial 
estimates lying in the range (0%, 49%], we find a mean overcharge of 16.47% with a median of 
16.17%. For the subsample of strictly positive OE, the mean is 16.68% while the median is 
16.17%. For the whole sample (including the zeros), the predicted mean is 15.47% while the 
median is 16.01%.22  
Table 9 
Means and medians of Bias-corrected OE per location and types of cartels. 
  
All 
Cartels OE > 0% 0%<OE≤49% OE>49% 
Cartels 
before 
1973 
Cartels 
after 
1973 
All 
locations 
Mean 15.47 16.68 16.47 17.31 13.97 16.07
Median 16.01 16.17 16.17 16.48 14.18 16.41
prop. 100.00 92.77 69.88 22.87 28.51 71.49
US 
Mean 14.36 15.82 15.69 16.30 15.13 14.00
Median 14.48 15.19 15.04 16.13 16.37 14.20
prop. 30.02 27.25 21.36 5.90 9.65 20.37
EU 
Mean 13.51 14.43 14.05 15.39 12.54 14.15
Median 14.08 14.20 13.67 15.32 13.18 15.86
prop. 33.51 31.36 22.52 8.85 13.40 20.11
Domestic 
Mean 12.93 14.21 14.09 14.86 13.08 12.87
Median 13.68 13.81 13.79 14.09 13.39 13.81
prop. 46.82 42.62 36.01 6.61 14.47 32.35
International 
Mean 17.71 18.78 19.01 18.30 14.89 18.71
Median 18.66 19.29 19.38 18.26 15.34 20.66
prop. 53.17 50.13 33.87 16.26 14.03 39.14
Note: For comparison purposes, we use the same column headings as in Table 1 that presents the raw OE. 
The proportions (%) are fractions of the total Connor sample (1119 cartels) 
 
For US cartels, we find a mean bias-corrected OE of 15,69% (with a median of 15.04%) for the 
subsample used for estimation and 14.36% (with a median of 14.48%) for the whole sample. For 
EU cartels, the corresponding figures are 14.05% (13.67%) and 13.51% (14.08%). Moreover, we 
find a mean bias-corrected OE of 17.71% (with a median of 18.66%) for international cartels and 
12.93% (with a median of 13.68%) for domestic cartels. Finally, we find that post-1973 cartels 
achieved higher bias-corrected mean overcharge (16.07%) than pre-1973 cartels (13.97%). 
Overall, the means and medians bias-corrected OE shown in Table 9 suggest a more homogenous 
behaviour of cartels than the means and medians raw OE shown in Table 1. 
                                                            
22 NOTE: these percentages are significantly lower than those reported at page 42 of our article Allain et 
alii (2015), published in International Review of Law and Economics 42, 38-47, which were due to a 
regrettable error in our MATLAB code. 
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Table 10 presents the mean bias-corrected OE for different categories of cartels according to 
whether they are domestic or international, in bid-rigging cases of not, and/or were found or 
pleaded guilty or not. Table 11 presents median bias-corrected OE for the same subgroups. The 
differences between the raw OE (Table 1 and the left-hand side of Tables 12 and 13) and the bias-
corrected ones (Table 9 and the right-hand side of Tables 12 and 13) are quite striking. In several 
cases, the bias-corrected OE is at least twice smaller than the raw OE. Our results support that 
cartels are overall more similar than what the raw OE data suggest.  
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Table 10 
Raw versus Bias-corrected mean OE.  
All numbers are expressed in percentage (%) 
 “n.a.” means that the corresponding category of cartels is not represented in the subsample of interest.  
 
Cartel characteristics  Raw  Average OE    Bias‐Corrected Average OE 
domestic  bidrig  Guilty  US  EU  ASIA  ROW WORLD     US  EU  ASIA  ROW WORLD 
Subsample with OE>0% 
Yes  Yes  Yes  27.61 18.41  29.47 17.40 18.70  15.04 12.91 16.64 13.77 17.04 
No  Yes  No  n.a.  430.00 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12.30 n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yes  No  No  50.62 25.79  89.33 18.67 n.a.  14.24 11.50 14.14 10.40 n.a. 
No  No  Yes  29.51 53.30  37.60 28.57 72.27  19.57 17.06 21.94 19.17 21.72 
Yes  Yes  No  21.18 16.67  4.88  14.50 n.a.  11.35 9.75  12.54 12.46 n.a. 
No  Yes  Yes  38.05 34.27  35.40 28.73 20.18  18.16 16.43 21.20 19.06 23.82 
Yes  No  Yes  52.54 20.92  57.64 11.41 n.a.  16.03 13.01 16.89 13.94 n.a. 
No  No  No  59.59 76.71  29.00 50.00 43.48  17.86 14.31 17.11 14.31 18.20 
Whole sample 
Yes  Yes  Yes  26.73 17.38  29.47 17.40 18.70  14.56 12.20 16.64 13.77 17.04 
No  Yes  No  n.a.  430.00 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12.30 n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yes  No  No  46.72 20.15  77.15 17.12 n.a.  13.14 8.99  12.21 9.54  n.a. 
No  No  Yes  27.67 52.78  37.60 24.49 71.89  18.34 16.90 21.94 16.43 21.61 
Yes  Yes  No  21.18 16.67  4.88  14.50 n.a.  11.35 9.75  12.54 12.46 n.a. 
No  Yes  Yes  38.05 32.89  35.40 28.73 20.18  18.16 15.77 21.20 19.06 23.82 
Yes  No  Yes  44.51 20.52  51.24 11.41 n.a.  13.58 12.76 15.01 13.94 n.a. 
No  No  No  46.56 72.20  29.00 50.00 34.29  13.95 13.47 17.11 14.31 14.35 
 
 
  
31 
 
 
Table 11 
Raw versus Bias-corrected median OE.  
All numbers are expressed in percentage (%) 
 “n.a.” means that the corresponding category of cartels is not represented in the subsample of interest.  
 
Cartel characteristics  Raw  Median Estimates         Bias‐Corrected Median Estimates
domestic  bidrig  Guilty  US  EU  ASIA  ROW  WORLD       US  EU  ASIA  ROW WORLD 
Subsample with OE>0% 
Yes  Yes  Yes  18.30 12.40  29.00 17.40 18.70  14.20 12.55 16.00 13.77 17.04 
No  Yes  No  n.a.  430.00 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12.30 n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yes  No  No  26.05 18.40  30.00 17.50 n.a.  13.98 11.41 14.49 10.18 n.a. 
No  No  Yes  31.80 29.00  17.50 24.50 29.60  19.38 16.17 21.83 18.99 21.59 
Yes  Yes  No  14.50 17.00  4.83  14.50 n.a.  10.82 9.47  12.54 12.46 n.a. 
No  Yes  Yes  25.75 21.00  29.80 30.55 13.45  17.76 16.16 21.20 18.78 23.27 
Yes  No  Yes  16.80 16.00  24.55 10.00 n.a.  15.49 12.20 16.48 13.78 n.a. 
No  No  No  50.00 50.00  29.00 50.00 31.25  18.52 14.20 17.11 14.31 17.58 
Whole sample 
Yes  Yes  Yes  18.05 12.15  29.00 17.40 18.70  14.20 12.55 16.00 13.77 17.04 
No  Yes  No  n.a.  430.00 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12.30 n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yes  No  No  24.70 13.50  24.50 13.60 n.a.  13.67 11.36 13.68 10.18 n.a. 
No  No  Yes  27.80 29.00  17.50 21.65 29.48  19.38 16.17 21.83 18.99 21.59 
Yes  Yes  No  14.50 17.00  4.83  14.50 n.a.  10.82 9.47  12.54 12.46 n.a. 
No  Yes  Yes  25.75 17.00  29.80 30.55 13.45  17.76 15.70 21.20 18.78 23.27 
Yes  No  Yes  14.90 15.95  23.25 10.00 n.a.  13.81 12.20 16.48 13.78 n.a. 
No  No  No  36.50 50.00  29.00 50.00 25.00  15.17 14.20 17.11 14.31 16.25 
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9.	Analysis	of	Variance	for	the	OE	Bias		
In this section, we attempt to understand which of the Z variables causes more bias in the raw OE. 
For that purpose, we define the bias as the difference between the log of the raw OE and the log of 
the bias-corrected OE.  
 ∆෠୧	ൌ logθ෠୧ െ ωෝ୧, 
where ωෝ୧ is the fitted value of Equation (15). We regressed ∆෠୧ on a constant and all Z dummy 
variables, keeping "econometric method" and "government report" as reference groups. 
We run separate regressions for effective cartels, cartels with OE≤49% and cartels with OE>49% 
(see Table 12). The percentage of explained variance is 8% for all effective cartels, 5% for cartels 
with OE≤49% and 16% for cartels with OE>49%. Thus, the R-square triples as we move from the 
subsample with OE≤49% to the one with OE>49%. This supports our previous finding that the raw 
OE lying above 49% are substantially more biased than the remainder of the sample.  
Table 12 
     
Effective 
Cartels (OE>0)
Cartels with 
0<OE<=49%
Cartels with 
OE>49% 
Es
tim
at
io
n m
et
ho
ds
 
Constant  0.36**  ‐0.44***  2.18*** 
OTHER  0.19  ‐0.07  ‐0.42* 
HISTOR  ‐0.19  ‐0.42  ‐0.28 
PBEFOR  0.33***  0.23**  ‐0.10 
PWAR  0.60**  0.42*  ‐0.19 
PAFTER  0.28**  0.15  ‐0.10 
COST  0.38**  0.12  0.20 
YARDST  0.65***  0.28***  0.35* 
LEGAL  0.05  0.05  0.03 
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
n m
ed
ia
  JOURNAL  ‐0.36**  0.23  ‐0.58*** 
MONOGR  0.00  0.47***  ‐0.40** 
EDBOOK  0.23  0.52***  ‐0.55*** 
COURT  ‐0.29*  0.21  ‐0.45*** 
NEWSPAPER  0.19  0.69*  ‐0.83** 
WORKP  ‐0.47***  0.21  ‐0.56*** 
SPEECH  ‐0.12  0.71*  ‐0.91 
R‐square  0.08  0.05  0.16 
Sum of Squared Residuals  1194.55  543.29  110.28 
Sample size  1038  782  256 
Note: The dependent variable is the log-bias defined as ∆෠୧	ൌ logθ෠୧ െ ωෝ୧, where ωෝ୧ is the fitted value 
of (15). The R-square doubles are we move from the subsample of all effective cartels to the 
subsample of cartels with OE>49%. Hence, the explanatory power of the Z variables is higher on the 
range OE>49%. 
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We perform a Chow test for the statibility of the coefficients across the two subsamples. The test 
statistic is given by: 
ܨ ൌ ሺ1194.55 െ 543.29 െ 110.28ሻ/16ሺ543.29 ൅ 110.28ሻ/ሺ1038 െ 2 ൈ 16ሻ ൌ 52.04 
Under the null hypothesis that coefficients are the same on the two subsamples, the F statistic is a 
Fisher random variable with (16,1006) degrees of freedom. At level 1%, the critical value of the 
Fisher distribution with (16,1006) degrees of freedom is 1.9832. Hence, the null hypothesis is 
overwhelmingly rejected. 
On the subsample of all effective cartels, all estimation methods (except HISTOR, LEGAL and 
OTHER) are biased upward relatively to the ECON method; the YARDST and PWAR methods 
seem to be the most important sources of positive bias on that subsample; OE published in 
government reports (GOVREP) are biased upward relatively to those published in academic 
journals, court decisions and working papers. 
On the subsampe of cartels with OE>49%, OTHER is less biased than ECON while YARDST is 
more biased; all other methods entail similar bias as the ECON method; OE published in 
government reports are biased upward relatively to those published in all other medias. 
On the subsample of cartels with OE≤49%, PBEFOR, PWAR and YARDST are more biased than 
ECON; OE published in government reports are less biased relatively to those published in all 
other medias. 
YARDST is the only variables whose effect is significant and of the same sign on both subsamples. 
For all other variables, the effect is either significant on one subsample only or of opposite signs on 
the two subsamples. 
10.		Conclusion	
Our study identifies the mean and median overcharges of cartels by performing a meta-analysis on 
an extended version of the database used in Connor (2010). Each observation in the sample is a 
potentially biased overcharge estimate (OE) obtained from a previous study. Three groups of 
variables describe the observations. The first group consists of variables (Y) that explain the true 
overcharge. The second group (Z) consists of factors that capture potential estimation biases. The 
third group contains a single variable (W) which indicates whether the alleged cartel pleaded or 
was found guilty. The latter variable is found to be endogenously related to the true overcharge. 
Our study bias-corrects the raw OE by cleaning them from the contribution of Z variables. 
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In order to assess the quality of the data, we used a Kullback-Leibler divergence to compare the 
probability of an OE being larger than θ conditional on (Y,W) to the same probability conditional 
on (Y,W,Z). The divergence between the two probabilities increases slowly on the range θ ∈
ሾ0%, 65%ሿ, but a large jump occurs at θ ൌ 65%. Although the results suggest the presence of bias 
in the raw OEs, this jump appears to be driven by other data problems. 
We pursued our empirical investigations by estimating Heckit models for the log of OE on 
subsamples of type ሺ0, θሿ. If the OE data were unbiased, the average bias-corrected OE for the 
subsample of cartels with ܱܧ ∈ ሺ0, θሿ should be increasing in θ and lower than the average bias-
corrected OE inferred for all successful cartels. Also, the curve of the average bias-corrected OE of 
all successful cartels should be flat in the upper range of θ. We find the latter condition to be 
violated. The curve of the average bias-corrected OE of all successful cartels is decreasing on 
θ ൑ 49% and increasing on θ ൐ 49%.  
Acting on these results, we estimate our final meta-analysis model on the subsample of ܱܧ ∈
ሺ0%, 49%ሿ. We employ a Heckit procedure to infer the bias-corrected OE of all effective cartels 
(strictly positive OE). The raw OE that are equal to zero are included back unaltered in the sample 
used for prediction. Our meta-analysis delivers mean and median bias-corrected OE of 16.47% and 
16.17% for the subsample with initial estimates lying in the range (0%, 49%], of 16.68% and 
16.17% for the subsample of effective cartels, and of 15.47% and 16.01% for the whole sample. 
Our results have significant implications for antitrust policy. Indeed, a major element in the 
prosecution of cartel is their capacity to exert upward pressures on prices. Becker (1968) and 
Landes (1983) examined the link between the cartel overcharge and the fine in a static game 
framework. Both authors concur that the optimal fine is equal to the illegal profit of the cartel 
divided by the probability of detection.  
Allain et alii (2011) argued that the Becker-Landes rule must be interpreted with caution in a 
dynamic framework. They show that the optimal fine can be computed as either the annual illegal 
profit divided by the annual probability of detection, or the cumulative illegal profit over the 
lifetime of the cartel divided by its lifetime probability of detection.  
Allain et alii (2015) and Harrington (2014) considered infinitely repeated games where a threat of 
deviation by a cartel member exists. Antitrust authorities may make the deviation profitable by 
granting partial or full leniency to the whistleblower. In such dynamic games, these authors show 
that the amount of the optimal fine is much lower than the correctly interpreted Becker-Landes rule 
suggests. Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) conducted an analysis that accounts for the timing of 
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antitrust authorities' decision and found that the optimal cartel fine is approximately 75% of the 
amount implied by the conventional formula.23  
The mean and median bias-corrected OE obtained from our analysis have little to say about any 
specific cartel case where an overcharge is used as a measure of antitrust damage. The true 
overcharge in a given case depends on the specific set of facts regarding the challenged conduct, 
the structure of the industry to which the cartel belongs (e.g., sector, concentration, elasticity of 
demand), etc. In addition to the previous factors, the estimated overcharge depends on the 
availability and quality of data, the method used to estimate the but-for price, etc. Hence, the 
analysis conducted in this paper could be improved if more data on cartels become available.  
  
                                                            
23 The link between the overcharge and the optimal fine is also studied by Nieberding (2006), Houba, 
Motchenkova and Wen (2013), Ginsburgh and Wright (2010) and Harrington (2005, 2010, 2014). 
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Appendix	A:	Summary	statistics	of	the	database	
Table	A1.	Cartels	with	Raw	OE	in	the	interval	(0%,	49%]	
  mean std min Max 
OE 20.46 12.20 0,1 49 
Duration 9.35 12.19 1 98 
duration (discrete) 1.84 1.05 1 4 
Domestic 0.52 0.50 0 1 
BidRig 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Guilty 0.71 0.45 0 1 
US 0.31 0.46 0 1 
EU 0.32 0.47 0 1 
ASIA 0.09 0.28 0 1 
ROW 0.04 0.20 0 1 
WORLD 0.24 0.43 0 1 
P1 0.01 0.09 0 1 
P2 0.09 0.28 0 1 
P3 0.10 0.30 0 1 
P4 0.13 0.34 0 1 
P5 0.62 0.49 0 1 
P6 0.05 0.23 0 1 
OTHER  0.05 0.21 0 1 
HISTOR  0.01 0.08 0 1 
PBEFOR  0.27 0.44 0 1 
PWAR  0.02 0.13 0 1 
PAFTER  0.13 0.34 0 1 
COST  0.04 0.20 0 1 
YARDST  0.13 0.34 0 1 
ECON 0.16 0.37 0 1 
LEGAL  0.19 0.39 0 1 
JOURNAL  0.21 0.41 0 1 
MONOGR  0.21 0.41 0 1 
EDBOOK  0.05 0.22 0 1 
GOVREP 0.25 0.43 0 1 
COURT  0.01 0.08 0 1 
NEWSPAPER 0.22 0.41 0 1 
WORKP  0.01 0.08 0 1 
SPEECH  0.05 0.21 0 1 
Sample size 782 
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Table	A2.	Cartels	with	Raw	OE=	0%	and	OE	>49%	
Cartels	with	Raw	OE	equal	to	0% Cartels	with	Raw	OE	above	49%
mean std min Max mean Std min Max 
OE 0.00 0.00 0 0 136.22 187.43 49,2 1800 
Duration 7.16 5.38 1 26 9.62 12.33 1 109 
duration (discrete) 1.86 1.10 1 4 1.92 1.08 1 4 
Domestic 0.58 0.50 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1 
BidRig 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Guilty 0.37 0.49 0 1 0.57 0.50 0 1 
US 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
EU 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.39 0.49 0 1 
ASIA 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 
ROW 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.02 0.12 0 1 
WORLD 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.25 0.44 0 1 
P1 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.01 0.09 0 1 
P2 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1 
P3 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 
P4 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 
P5 0.47 0.50 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1 
P6 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 
OTHER  0.16 0.37 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 
HISTOR  0.14 0.34 0 1 0.01 0.09 0 1 
PBEFOR  0.20 0.40 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1 
PWAR  0.01 0.11 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1 
PAFTER  0.11 0.32 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 
COST  0.04 0.19 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1 
YARDST  0.09 0.28 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 
ECON 0.02 0.16 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 
LEGAL  0.23 0.43 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 
JOURNAL  0.44 0.50 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 
MONOGR  0.21 0.41 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1 
EDBOOK  0.10 0.30 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 
GOVREP 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1 
COURT  0.00 0.00 0 0 0.02 0.14 0 1 
NEWSPAPER 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 
WORKP  0.00 0.00 0 0 0.00 0.06 0 1 
SPEECH  0.11 0.32 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Sample size 81 256 
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Appendix	B:	Our	Previous	Attempts	to	Bias‐Correct	the	OE  
In Boyer and Kotchoni (2011),24.we conduct a meta-analysis by introducing three refinements with 
respect to Connor and Bolotova (2006). In a first step, we remove the cartels with alleged 
overcharge estimates that are larger than or equal to 50% as well as zero overcharge estimates 
representing 7.2% of the sample because the proportion of such estimates is susceptible of being 
affected by the publication bias. Second, we use a K-means analysis to separate the sample of 
overcharges into four “homogenous” groups. And third, we model the logarithm of overcharges as 
a linear function of the explanatory variables mentioned above, while assuming that the coefficients 
of variables that capture the bias vary across the clusters identified in the K-means analysis. A 
Heckman correction is used to eliminate the sample selection bias due to the exclusion of zeros and 
outliers.  
Our results show that the bias captured by the estimation method and the publication source is 
substantial and economically significant. The bias-corrected estimates obtained from the meta-
analysis by adequately neutralizing the effects of those variables suggest that the representative 
average overcharge estimate for cartels with initial overcharge estimates above 0% and below 50% 
is approximately 13.62% (with a median of 13.63%), while the average for all types of cartels is 
approximately 17.52% (with a median of 14.05%). 
Critics of the analyses conducted in Boyer and Kotchoni (2011) centered on the following issues: 
the trimming of the sample at 50% has not been well-motivated; the regressors used for the meta-
analysis include the indicators of the clusters identified in a prior K-means analysis on the same 
data; the Heckit procedure assumed that the same latent variable drives the occurrence of zeros OE 
and OE above 50%; the variable indicating whether the cartel members pleaded or were found 
guilty is likely endogenous.  
In Boyer and Kotchoni (2012),25 we conduct further K-means analyses which support that the 
subsample of cartels with raw OE lying in the range [0,50%] (70% of the sample) is quite 
representative of the whole universe of cartels. We then argue that the average bias-corrected OE 
obtained in Boyer and Kotchoni (2011) is one of the typical cartel.  
Boyer and Kotchoni (2014)26 largely follows the same methodology as in the present paper, but it 
fails to address the endogeneity of Guilty decision or plea. In particular, it relies on Kullback-
Leibler divergences (in lieu of K-means analyses) to underscore the presence of bias in the raw OE 
                                                            
24 Circulated under the title "The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges" (CIRANO 2011s-35) 
25 Circulated under the title "How Much Do Cartels Typically Overcharge?" (CIRANO 2012s-15) 
26 Circulated under the title "How Much Do Cartels Overcharge?" (TSE WP-462) 
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data and bring other data problems to light. Boyer and Kotchoni (2014) find an average bias-
corrected OE of 16.99% for the subsample of effective cartels and of 15.76% for all cartels.27 
In the present paper, we move one step beyond Boyer and Kotchoni (2014) by taking the 
endogeneity of the “guilty” dummy variable into account. We apply the Heckit procedure to 
effective cartels so that only the right truncation of the data needs to be controlled; and the zero raw 
OE are included unaltered in the sample used to predict the bias-corrected OE of all cartels. We 
find an average bias-corrected OE of 16.68% (median of 16.17%) for the subsample of effective 
cartels and of 15.47% (median 16.01%) for all cartels. 
Appendix	C:	The	Overcharge	Estimation	Methods	
Many authors acknowledge that overcharges represent the bulk of the damages caused by cartels. 
This explains why the largest body of the economic literature on cartels has been devoted to their 
price effects. The methods often used by academic researchers and forensic economists to estimate 
the cartel overcharge can be summarized into 5 groups: price before/after the conspiracy, price 
during a price war, yardstick method, cost-based method, and econometric method. Each of these 
approaches is briefly explained below. 
The " before-and-after" Methods 
This method is based on the comparison of the price during the alleged cartel period with the price 
before and/or after the cartel. As pointed out by Connor (2007): "this method should be called the " 
with-and-without collusion method" since the " before" period is really any nonconspiracy period--
-whether before, after, or during an intermediate pause in price-fixing" 
This method does not control for shifts in demand or cost functions. For that reason, Connor 
(2010b states:"it is important that the ‘before’ period be one that is quite comparable to the 
conspiracy period with respect to demand and supply conditions. Shifts in buyer preferences, 
appearance or the disappearance of substitutes, or changes in the cost of production of the 
cartelized product during the affected period can cause overstatement or understatement of the 
overcharge." 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
27 The latter number is lower as it is a weighted average of 0% and 16.99%. 
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Figure C.1 
Before-and-After Methods  
  
The lack of robustness of the before-and-after method is illustrated by the following citation from 
Finkelstein and Levenback (1983): "An obvious idea is to assume that competitive prices during 
the conspiracy period would have been the same as they were before or after the conspiracy or in 
interludes of competition within the conspiracy period [...] This estimate, however, meets the 
immediate objection that it is likely to be incorrect because changes in factors affecting price other 
than the conspiracy would have produced changes in competitive prices if there had been 
competition during the conspiracy period."  
This lack of robustness is further enhanced by the difficulty of correctly specifying when the 
conspiracy begins and when it ends. Indeed, an incorrect specification of the conspiracy period may 
result in biased estimates and lead to wrong conclusions, as illustrated by the following citation 
from Levenstein, and Suslow (2002): "Connor writes that there was ‘disagreement about the dates 
of the conspiracy-effects period, the but-for price, and the type of industry conduct absent 
collusion.’ Connor uses marginal cost (estimated from what he identifies as " highly competitive" 
periods) as the competitive price."  
The " Price during a price war" Method 
This method uses the price during a price war of laps of collusion to proxy the but-for price. This 
method is basically an instance of the before-and-after method and thus suffers from the same 
limitations. 
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Figure C.2 
Price war interlude 
 
In Yinne (2003), the "overcharge is calculated as imports*price increase/(1+price increase), and 
the price increase is estimated from the observed price drop subsequent to the cartel's demise." 
Unfortunately, the price drop that is referred to in this citation is probably not driven by normal 
economic forces. In general, prices during a price war can be significantly lower than in natural 
competition equilibrium. As acknowledged by Connor (2007): "a predatory episode before cartel 
formation will strongly overestimate the overcharge, as happened in lysine."  
The Yardstick Method 
This method compares the prices during the conspiracy period with comparable or yardstick, 
assumed competitive firms, product or geographic markets during the alleged cartel period. The 
yardstick method should be used with caution because an increase in price due to domestic market 
cartelization can cause a partial demand shift toward nearby markets. Similar domestic firms that 
are not participating in the collusion will tend to follow the cartel price (umbrella effect). Connor 
(2010b) states: "The yardstick approach involves the identification of a market similar to the one in 
which prices were fixed but where prices were unaffected by the conspiracy. A yardstick market 
should have cost structures and demand characteristics highly comparable to the cartelized 
market, yet lie outside the orbit of the cartel's influence." 
Hence, the Yardstick method may not be appropriate in the case of certain international cartels (e.g. 
the ADM-lysine case). 
The " Cost-Based" Method 
This method is based on the observation that changes in price should reflect changes in costs. The 
direct way to apply this method is to estimate the production costs by using the (accounting) 
information on firms involved in the cartel. In the lysine cartel case, prosecutors have introduced 
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the confidential production and sales records of ADM as exhibits, and these documents are now 
publicly available. (See Connor 2001). 
But typically, academic researchers and economic experts do not have access to confidential 
documents of firms. In general, the overcharge is thus approximated by substracting a " reasonable 
margin"  from the actual cartel profit and dividing by the production volume. The reasonable 
margin should include not only the marginal production cost, but also other factors that causes the 
natural competition price to be larger than the marginal production cost. In particular, it should 
include opportunity costs, the risk premium and oligopoly mark-up when relevant. Failure to 
account for these would lead to overestimating the overcharge. 
"Econometric" Methods 
Econometric methods are not tied to a particular economic theory. This denomination gathers all 
methods using more or less sophisticated econometric models to assess the but-for price. 
Econometric methods can be used to simulate an oligopolistic competition (Cournot, Bertrand), to 
predict the Lerner index of market power or to estimate a demand and cost functions that account 
for dynamic market conditions. A simple example is given in Froeb, Koyak and Werden (1993): 
"To estimate conspiracy-free prices for the earlier periods, we first fit logarithms of frozen perch 
winning bid prices for the post-conspiracy period on the logarithms of fresh perch prices for the 
corresponding month and for the prior five months. These opportunity cost variables explain 
77.0% of the variance in frozen perch bid prices. This regression is then used to `backcast' 
predicted, conspiracy-free prices for the earlier periods."  
The potential of this method is illustrated by the following citation from Connor (2007): "Demand 
for animal feed rises in the winter months, which results in an increase in the derived demand for 
lysine in the fall of each year. Econometric methods are better equipped to handle seasonal shifters 
than the simple before-and-after method. Because collusion is best timed to begin when seasonal 
demand rises, ignoring this factor will lead to an overestimate of damages". This citation suggests 
that an econometric model if correctly built is more robust than simpler methods. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that econometric methods are always more reliable than other methods. 
In fact, building a good econometric model requires a careful selection of the relevant control 
variables to include. Also, the estimation results must be interpreted in light of the theory 
underlying the model.	 	
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Appendix	D:	Controlling	for	the	Sample	Selection	Bias	
Leaving roughly 30% of cartels out of the sample28 used for our estimation may cause some of our 
conclusions to loose generality. This would be true even if we know that including these cartels 
deteriorates the results of the analysis. The absence or deletion of a non negligible proportion of 
observations raises a sample selection problem well documented in Heckman (1979). In the present 
case, the deletion of observations (with original overcharge estimates of 0% and of ≥49%) for 
estimation purposes is done to avoid obtaining distorted results due to outliers. 
In models that are linear in the parameters, Heckman (1979) shows that the bias induced by sample 
selection on regression coefficients is a missing regressor problem. To fix ideas, let us assume there 
exists a latent index X୧∗ indicating the quality of the data.29 In the present context, the quality of an 
observation is defined in relation with its contribution to the quality of the estimation results. In 
concrete terms, large positive overcharge estimates are considered poor quality data, not 
necessarily because they are measured with more bias than other observations, but because 
including them distorts the relevancy of the results of our analysis.30 
Suppose that the quality indicator X୧∗ takes the following value for cartel i: 
X୧∗ ൌ A ൅ Y୧B ൅W୧C ൅ Z୧D ൅ u୧∗ (D.1) 
where u୧∗ follows a standard normal distribution. Assume that this latent variable is such that the 
cartel i is included in the meta-analysis if and only if X୧∗ ൐ 0, while the cartel is exluded 
otherwise.31 By definition, the estimation of the model is done only on the portion of the sample 
where X୧∗ ൐ 0. The expectation of the overcharge estimates X୧	on this subsample is: 
EሺX୧|Y, Z, X୧∗ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅W୧γ ൅ Z୧δ ൅ Eሺε୧|X୧∗ ൐ 0ሻ		 ሺD.2ሻ	
The sample selection bias is controlled by estimating the following equation: 
X୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅W୧γ ൅ Z୧δ ൅ Eሺε୧|X୧∗ ൐ 0ሻ ൅ e୧,			 ሺD.3ሻ	
                                                            
28 In total, 22.87% of overcharge estimates larger than 49% and 7.23% of zero overcharge estimates. 
29 A latent variable is an unobserved variable that may have observable implications. A latent variable may 
be inferred using some of its observable implications along with mild identification assumptions. 
30 In the same vein, the log of zero is equal to minus infinity, hence zeros may be considered outliers in a log-
linear regression analysis 
31 If the population of interest is the whole universe of cartels,  our assumption on the latent variable is 
consistent with a situations where X୧∗ ൒ b for zero overcharge estimates, X୧∗ ൏ ܾ for estimates lying in (0%, 
49%] and X୧∗ ൒ b the for observations above 49%. This amounts to assuming that the latent factor is 
nonlinear in the OE. However, one might argue that the latent variable that drives the occurrence of zeros is 
different from the one that drives the occurrence of outliers. To address this critic, we assume in the present 
paper that zero OE are unbiased and pursue the meta-analysis using the subsample of cartels with OE>0. This 
leads us to find the bias-corrected OE of effective cartels, which is combines with the zero OE (left 
unaltered) to obtain the bias-corrected OE of all cartels. 
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where the error term e୧ ≡ ε୧ െ Eሺε୧|X୧∗ ൐ 0ሻ has zero expectation by construction. It can be shown 
that: 
Eሺε୧|X୧∗ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ ζ ஦ሺ୅ାଢ଼౟୆ା୛౟ୋ୞౟ୈሻ஍ሺ୅ାଢ଼౟୆ା୛౟ୋ୞౟ୈሻ			 ሺD.4ሻ	
where the theoretical value of θ	is	Corrሺε୧, u୧ሻσෝகଶ and φ and Φ are the standard normal density and 
cumulative distributions respectively.32 Let us consider the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) defined as: 
imr୧ ൌ ஦ሺ୅ାଢ଼౟୆ା୛౟ୋ୞౟ୈሻ஍ሺ୅ାଢ଼౟୆ା୛౟ୋ୞౟ୈሻ		 ሺD.5ሻ	
When	restricted	to	the	subsample	of	cartels	defined	by	X୧∗ ൐ 0,	the	estimating	equation	ሺD.3ሻ	
is	equivalent	to:	
X୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅W୧γ ൅ Z୧δ ൅ imr୧ζ ൅ e୧,			 ሺD.6ሻ	
If the IMR is not included in the estimating equation, the coefficients β, γ and ζ are estimated with 
bias. In this case, the model can still be used to predict the mean overcharge conditional on X୧∗ ൐
0, but not conditional on Y, W and Z. Given this, only the model that controls for sample selection 
can be used to bias-correct individual overcharge estimates. 
A probit can be estimated to infer fitted values of X୧∗ and the IMR. Such a probit analysis is 
interesting per se because it permits to see the categories of cartels that have been excluded the 
most. We do not observe the latent variable, but we do know if an observation is excluded (Ii=0) or 
not (Ii=1). If observation i is included, then it must be the case that X୧∗ ൐ 0, which in turn implies 
that A ൅ Y୧B ൅W୧C ൅ Z୧D ൅ u୧∗ ൐ 0, or equivalently, -u୧∗ ൏ ܣ ൅ Y୧B ൅W୧C ൅ Z୧D. Because u୧∗ is 
standard normal, the likelihood of this observation is equal to: 
L୧ ൌ ΦሺA ൅ Y୧B ൅W୧C ൅ Z୧Dሻ	 ሺD.7ሻ	
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. Likewise, if observation i is 
excluded, then it must be the case that X୧∗ ൏ 0, which implies that -u୧∗ ൐ ܣ ൅ Y୧B ൅W୧C ൅ Z୧D. 
Hence the likelihood of an excluded observation is given by 1 െ L୧, where L୧ is defined above. The 
sample log-likelihood of the probit is thus given by: 
ࣦሺA, B, C, Dሻ ൌ ∑ ሼI୧ ∗ logL୧ ൅ ሺ1 െ I୧ሻ ∗ log	ሺ1 െ L୧ሻሽ୘୧ୀଵ 	 ሺD.8ሻ	
Maximizing this log-likelihood with respect to parameters A, B, C and D gives their Probit 
estimates A෡, B෡, C෠ , and D෡. 
                                                            
32 This result is obtained by exploiting the definition of Eሺε୧|X୧∗ ൐ 0ሻ, which is the expectation of ε with 
respect to its density conditional on -u୧∗ ൏ ܣ ൅ Y୧B ൅W୧C ൅ Z୧D. This density is of truncated type and is 
obtained by exploiting the bivariate Gaussian distribution of (ε୧, u୧∗). See Heckman (1979) for details. 
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Let X෡୧∗ ൌ A෡ ൅ Y୧B෡ ൅W୧C෠ ൅ Z୧D෡ be the fitted values of X୧∗. Empirically, the sample selection bias is 
controlled in the meta analysis by including the estimated inverse Mills ratio obtained from the 
Probit extimation as an additional regressor. For an included cartel, we have: 
ımrෞ ୧ ൌ ஦൫	ଡ଼෡౟
∗	൯
஍൫	ଡ଼෡౟∗	൯	 ሺD.9ሻ	
Heckman (1979) shows that including ımrෞ ୧ as an additional regressor allows to consistently 
estimate the coefficients of the model linking the dependent variable (original overcharge 
estimates) to the explanatory variables Y, W and Z, as if the whole sample were available and used. 
The estimating equation is thus given by: 
X୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅W୧γ ൅ Z୧δ ൅ ımrෞ ୧ζ ൅ e୧.	 ሺD.10ሻ	
The meta-analysis conducted in this paper can be summarized as follows: (D.8) is maximized using 
the subsample of cartels with OE>0; next, the estimated coefficients A෡, B෡, C෠ , and D෡ are used to 
calculate the IMR given in (D.9) for the subsample of cartels with ܱܧ ∈ ሺ0%, 49%ሿ; next, the 
regression (D.10) is estimated using the subsample of cartels with	ܱܧ ∈ ሺ0%, 49%ሿ; finally, the 
coefficients obtained from (D.10) are used to bias-correct all OE>0. Zero OE as assumed exempt of 
bias. 
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